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TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER HILLMAN* 
 
A. Introduction 
 Virtually every major international gathering of world leaders recently has ended in failure—or at 
least failure to reach enough agreement to issue a concluding statement or communique.1  These failures 
come at a time when many have been looking for signs that world leaders would come together to address 
the most pressing problems facing the world—including climate change, the breakdown in the rules of the 
international trading system, the need everywhere for good jobs that pay a living wage, and rapidly 
growing income inequality.  
The failure of these meetings to produce formal agreements—or even specific paths to reaching 
agreements in the future—despite the high stakes has left many questioning the ability of the world’s 
leaders to meet global challenges, shedding a spotlight on the institutions and fora that were established 
for the purpose of achieving multilateral solutions—particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The failure to reach agreements can best be 
seen as part of a long-term trend toward increased complexity in the world that makes it nearly impossible 
to reach traditional multilateral binding accords, combined with a waning of faith on the part of many 
countries in multilateralism and multilateral institutions.2   
A number of clear trends emerge from the failures to reach accords at virtually all recent 
international gatherings: 
1) Government policies and international arrangements for collective decision-making have not 
kept pace with changes in the world, especially the high degree of international economic integration and 
interdependence. 
                                                          
* Jennifer Hillman is a Professor from Practice at the Georgetown University Law Center.  She is a former member 
of the WTO Appellate Body and also served as a Commissioner at the U.S. International Trade Commission and as 
an Ambassador and General Counsel in the Office of the United States Trade Representative. 
 
1 See, for example, Summit of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in Papua New Guinea, November 18, 2018 
(failure of an agreed-upon communique among the 21 nations of APEC blamed on US-China trade tensions and the 
growing competition for influence among the South Pacific countries) 
https://www.apnews.com/e4df315e69e24472a412667ff9086df0; G-20 Finance Ministers, Buenos Aires, March 20, 
2018 (no agreement on usual communiqué of shared principles on major economic policies due to trade issues); G-7 
meeting, Quebec, Canada, June 8-9, 2018 (President Trump rejected a previously agreed-upon communique and 
disparaged Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau); G-20 leaders meetings in Hamburg, July 2017 (final text was held up 
by objections to the US’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, despite agreement on 
most aspects of the final statement); WTO 11th Ministerial Meeting, Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 2017 
(ended with no concluding statement and no new agreements).                    
2 Concerns over the functioning of the international economic institutions and analyses about how to 
improve them have existed for decades.  A number of these ideas were summarized, along with the 
suggestion that the G-20 be used as a fora in which renovation of the WTO, IMF and World Bank could 
be coordinated, in Saving Multilateralism:  Renovating the House of Global Economic Governance for the 
21st Century, Jennifer Hillman, German Marshall Fund of the US, attached as Appendix A and available at: 
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/saving-multilateralism. 
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Much of the increasing complexity in the international economic order stems from the explosive 
growth in the number and size of multinational corporations and financial institutions, many of which now 
dwarf the size of most of the nations in the world.3   Added to the complexity is the increase in the speed at 
which goods, money and technology moves around the globe in our digital age.  
2) Learning to operate in this vastly more complex world will require more multilateralism, not 
less.   
 As countries emerged from the era of colonialization and began opening their markets, the number 
of players on global stage increased, making reaching consensus among a much larger group of disparate 
interests more difficult. But because the most significant problems facing the world cross many 
international boundaries, solving them will require that countries come together to find regional, 
plurilateral, or global solutions. 
3) It is essential that the international economic institutions be updated and improved, not destroyed 
or left to wither.  
Because it is clear that reaching major new binding accords or creating new international 
institutions is quite difficult, the best and most achievable solution is to renovate our existing institutions.  
Each needs to modernize and improve their governance structures to ensure that work can get done despite 
the increases in complexities and to update their mandates to ensure the ability to address the problems of 
the 21st century, many of which are quite different from those that existed in the 1940s when these 
institutions were created.  
Given that the crisis is most acute at the WTO, this testimony will focus on what must be done to 
renovate the World Trade Organization and why doing so is critical, both for the trading system and for the 
continued existence of a rules-based international economic order.  The need for the WTO and its dispute 
settlement system to remain viable is particularly critical if we are to address the challenges presented by 
the explosive growth of China and its transformation into the largest exporter of goods in the world.4 
B.  The Crisis at the WTO 
The WTO was created in 1995 as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) at the height of support for multilateralism and multilateral institutions.  In recent years, many 
have expressed frustration with the WTO.  The concerns include: 
1) a lack of balance—the negotiating arm of the WTO is weak and WTO members have reached only one 
new agreement –on trade facilitation—since 1995, while the dispute settlement arm has been (at least 
until the blockage at the Appellate Body in 2017) considered very strong—some say too strong, while the 
executive arm is viewed as highly competent but lacking in authority to drive change.5 
                                                          
3 For example, Apple Inc. recently crossed the $1 trillion market capitalization figure, which makes 
it larger than the GDP of 183 out of the 199 countries for which the World Bank has GDP data. 
4 In 2017, China’s merchandise exports exceeded $2.3 trillion, far outstripping all other countries in the world, as 
the United States’ merchandise exports were close to $1.6 trillion, followed by Germany at just over $1.4 trillion, 
with all other countries merchandise exports far below $1 trillion.  WTO Trade Statistical Review 2018. 
5 USTR Robert Lighthizer commented on the relative strength of dispute settlement compared to 
negotiation in his remarks at the WTO’s most recent Ministerial Conference (MC-11) in Buenos Aires: 
“[M]any are concerned that the WTO is losing its essential focus on negotiation and becoming a litigation-
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2) a limited mandate that does not readily allow the WTO to take on the “trade and . . .” issues connected 
to trade’s impact on the environment, labor, the uneven distribution of the benefits of trade, competition 
policy, currency manipulation, or corruption around trade, or to ensure that the trading system rules 
contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals agreed to by the world’s leaders in 2015. 
3) a bifurcation of members into “developed” versus “developing” country camps, with no in between for 
the emerging economies such as India, Russia, Brazil, or South Africa and no easy way to address the rise 
of China--now the largest merchandise exporter and second largest merchandise importer in the world. 
4) a recent willingness, led by the United States, to impose tariffs that violate the WTO’s basic rules, 
leading many to question the point of having a rules-based organization if its major members openly flout 
those rules. 
5) a lack of enforcement of the transparency and notification requirements of the WTO, with most 
countries hopelessly behind on making required disclosures of their policies and practices, particularly 
with respect to the granting of subsidies. 
Possible fixes? 
Given the impossibility in today’s climate of creating new multilateral institutions, it is imperative that 
the WTO be renovated to make it a more efficient and effective organization.6  How? 
1.  New measures to enforce transparency and notification requirements 
2.  New rules relating to subsidies to address the major subsidy failings: a) too narrow a definition of 
government or public body that can be the “giver” of a subsidy, b) too high an evidentiary burden and c) 
an ineffective remedy that simply calls on countries to “remove the adverse effects” of an illegal subsidy. 
3.  New negotiation dynamics to allow more plurilateral negotiations among a coalition of interested 
countries 
4.  Empower the WTO Secretariat to recommend solutions and drive toward negotiated outcomes  
5.  Enhance the mandate of the WTO to include the “trade and . . .” issues. 
 
                                                          
centered organization.  Too often members seem to believe they can gain concessions through lawsuits that 
they could never get at the negotiating table.”   
6 A number of major studies have been done suggesting ways to improve the functioning of the WTO, 
including “The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium: 
Report of the Consultation Board to the Director-General Supachia Pantichpakdi” (2004) (“the 
Sutherland Report”); “The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward?” (2007), The 
Warwick Commission Report, 
https://warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/worldtrade/report/; and most recently, the 
report of the high-level board of experts convened by the Bertelsmann Stiftung foundation, 
“Revitalizing Multilateral Governance at the World Trade Organization” (2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/bertelsmann_rpt_e.pdf. 
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C.  The United States Needs the WTO to Effectively Address Its Concerns with China 
Concerns in the United States and around the world with China’s practices and policies have been 
growing with each passing year.   These concerns were recently succinctly summarized in the statement 
made by U.S. Ambassador to the WTO Dennis Shea in a May 8, 2018 statement to the WTO General 
Council: 
China . . . is consistently acting in ways that undermine the global system of open and fair 
trade.  Market access barriers too numerous to mention; forced technology transfers; 
intellectual property theft on an unprecedented scale; indigenous innovation policies and 
the Made in China 2025 program; discriminatory use of technical standards; massive 
government subsidies that have led to chronic overcapacity in key industrial sectors; and a 
highly restrictive foreign investment regime.7 
The concerns are further laid out in two recent documents:  
(1) the Section 301 Report, issued by USTR on March 2, 2018,8 which raises four core concerns: 
First, China uses foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture requirements and foreign 
equity limitations, and various administrative review and licensing processes, to require or pressure 
technology transfer from foreign companies. 
Second, China’s regime of technology regulations forces U.S. companies seeking to license 
technologies to Chinese entities to do so on non-market-based terms that favor Chinese recipients and that 
violates China’s national treatment requirements to treat foreign investors no less favorably than it treats 
domestic investors. 
Third, China directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, foreign 
companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property 
and generate the transfer of technology to Chinese companies.  The role of the state in directing and 
supporting this outbound investment strategy is pervasive, and evident at multiple levels of government – 
central, regional, and local. 
Fourth, China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the computer 
networks of foreign companies to access their sensitive commercial information and trade secrets. 
This initial Section 301 report was recently updated with additional evidence and new data, with 
the conclusion that “China fundamentally has not altered its acts, policies, and practices related to 
technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, and indeed appears to have taken further 
unreasonable actions in recent months.”9 
(2) the 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, issued by USTR January 2018, 
which is the sixteenth such report and examines nine categories of WTO commitments undertaken 
                                                          
7 Statement as delivered by Ambassador Dennis Shea, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. permanent 
Representative to the WTO, WTO General Council, Geneva, May 8, 2018. 
8  Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, And Practices Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, And Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act Of 1974, Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF. 
9 USTR Update Concerning China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Relating to Technology  Transfer, Intellectual 
Property and Innovation, November 20, 2018, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf 
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by China (trading rights, import regulation, export regulation, internal policies affecting trade, 
investment, agriculture, intellectual property right, services and legal framework), with this year’s 
report concluding that “the United States erred in supporting China’s entry into the WTO on terms 
that have proven to be ineffective in securing China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade 
regime.”10 
Both Reports raise the obvious question of what the most effective tool or set of tools to address 
this myriad of interwoven and overlapping concerns is.   
The best approach would be a big, bold, comprehensive case at the WTO filed by a broad coalition 
of countries that share the United States’ substantive concerns about China—even if they strongly oppose 
the Trump Administration’s unilateral tactics or the sequencing of actions that began with putting tariffs on 
steel and aluminum imports from those same countries that the United States needs to be working with on 
such an action at the WTO.   
D. A Big, Bold WTO Case is the Best Way to Address the Deep, Systemic China Problems 
Why? 
First, a broad and deep WTO case represents the best opportunity to bring together enough of the 
trading interests in the world to put sufficient pressure on China make it clear that fundamental reform is 
required if China is to remain a member in good standing in the WTO.  The U.S. needs to use the power of 
collective action to impress upon both China and the WTO how significant the concerns really are.  The 
United States simply cannot bring about the kind of change that is needed using a go-it-alone strategy.  A 
coalition case also has the potential to shield its members from direct and immediate retaliation by China.  
Second, a comprehensive WTO case would restore confidence in the WTO and its ability to address 
fundamental flaws in the rules of the trading system.  As U.S. Ambassador Dennis Shea put it, “If the WTO 
wishes to remain relevant, it must – with urgency – confront the havoc created by China’s state 
capitalism.”11   If the WTO can be seen to be able to either bend or amend its rules to take on the challenges 
presented by China’s “socialist market economy” framework, then faith in the institution and its rules-based 
system can be enhanced, for the good of the United States and the world. 
Third, the work to put together a coalition, to research and agree upon the Chinese measures to be 
challenged and the claims to be made, and to litigate in a coordinated way at the WTO would make it less 
likely that the United States would accept a limited agreement connected to the U.S.- 
China bilateral trade deficit.  Certainly the United States’ partners in such a coalition would raise strong 
objection to the U.S. accepting an agreement under which China simply agreed to shift its purchases of 
soybeans from Brazil to the U.S. or its sourcing of energy products from Russia and Central Asia to the 
United States.   Given that the Trump Administration has expended considerable political energy and clout 
in threatening the imposition of Section 301 tariffs on China, it is essential that they emerge from the process 
                                                          
10  2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
January 2018, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WTO%20Report.pdf; pg.2 
11  Statement as delivered by Ambassador Dennis Shea, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. permanent 
Representative to the WTO, WTO General Council, Geneva, May 8, 2018. 
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with measures to address the many real problems with China rather than simply addressing bilateral goods 
trade deficit.12 A coalition may be the best way to avoid a narrow, deficit-focused bilateral deal. 
E. The Time is Ripe for a WTO Case Now 
The suggestion to bring a bold WTO case against China now certainly begs the question:  if such a 
case is so clearly warranted and the problems have persisted for so long, why hasn’t it been brought before 
now?  
Among the reasons may be the following: 
First, bringing a collective case, with multiple complainants, is never easy, as it requires 
tremendous coordination of both the legal tasks of drafting and pleading and of the substantive arguments 
to be made, which may favor one country more than others or raise concerns for some but not all of the 
coalition.   Only a handful of the 547 WTO complaints brought to date have been brought by a coalition of 
countries, but for this case to be most effective, a coalition is needed.  And many of the potential coalition 
partners have been working with the U.S. in other fora, including the OECD, the G-7, and the Global Forum 
on Steel Excess Capacity.  The need to pool together both the evidence and the political power of as large 
a coalition as can be mustered will be important to achieving sustained pressure at the highest levels on 
China. 
Second, many countries in the past have been reluctant to bring WTO disputes unless they were 
virtually assured of a victory.  No one wanted to lose, given the diplomatic and political fallout that can 
occur from one country accusing another foreign sovereign of being a rules scofflaw.  But in light of the 
depth and breadth of the concerns about China, now is the time to throw caution to the wind and bring a 
big case that challenges a number of both specific measures and systemic matters, assuming there is sound 
evidence to ensure that each claim has been brought in the good faith required by the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU).13  Moreover, a number of the most likely applicable provisions have not 
yet been tested, against China or any other country.  In the past when tried for the first time, WTO rules 
have generally been found to work. 
Third, many countries (and the companies within those countries) have been reluctant to take on 
China for fear of retaliation by China, in ways both obvious and hidden.14  Countries fear that China will 
impose trade remedies or other measures on their exports or deny needed permits to their companies or file 
                                                          
12 In Beijing on May 3-4, at its first high-level meeting with China following the release of the Section 301 Report, 
the United States presented it draft framework (attached herewith as Appendix A) for balancing the trade 
relationship with China, noting that “there is an immediate need for the United States and China to reduce the U.S. 
trade deficit with China,” and listing as the first of eight issues the request for a commitment by China to reduce the 
US-China trade deficit by $200 billion.   
13 Article 10 of the DSU provides: “It is understood that requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute 
settlement procedures should not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all 
Members will engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute.”  
14 As stated in the Section 301 Report (at pg.9):  U.S. companies “fear that they will face retaliation or the loss of 
business opportunities if they come forward to complain about China’s unfair trade practices.  . . .” Multiple 
submissions noted the great reluctance of U.S. companies to share information on China’s technology transfer 
regime, given the importance of the China market to their businesses and the fact that Chinese government officials 
are ‘not shy about retaliating against critics.’ For example, a representative of the Commission on the Theft of 
American Intellectual Property testified at the hearing:  ‘American companies are intimidated and reticent over the 
issue, especially in China.  There they risk punishment by a powerful and opaque Chinese regulatory system.’  In 
addition, according to the U.S. China Business Council, their member companies do not presently have ‘reliable 
channel[s] to report abuses and to appeal adverse decisions…without fear of retaliation.’” 
7 
 
WTO challenges, all in direct response to claims of unfair trade practices, forced technology transfers or 
intellectual property theft.  While not a perfect shield, bringing a broad, coalition-based case would lessen 
the likelihood that China would or could effectively retaliate against all of the coalition partners, much less 
the many industries and companies that would be standing behind the case. 
Fourth, bringing cases against China has often presented very difficult evidentiary hurdles, as much 
of the information and evidence needed to support a claim, particularly a claim based on unwritten rules or 
practices, can be quite difficult to obtain.  As noted above, one of the ongoing complaints of the United 
States and others is the lack of transparency in China, particularly around the issue of granting licenses or 
permits.  As stated in the Section 301 Report:  “The fact that China systematically implements its technology 
transfer regime in informal and indirect ways makes it ‘just as effective [as written requirements], but 
almost impossible to prosecute.’ . . . Nevertheless . . .  confidential industry surveys, where companies may 
report their experiences anonymously, make clear that they are receiving such pressure.  The lack of 
transparency in the regulatory environment, the complex relationship between the State and the private 
sector, and concerns about retaliation have enabled China’s technology transfer regime to persist for more 
than a decade.”15  However, it is clear that over the course of the last decade or more, through the work of 
this Commission, USTR and other U.S. government agencies, along with numerous business and industry 
groups, that a substantial amount of evidence has been collected here in the United States. The combination 
of the extraordinarily comprehensive and well-documented Section 301 Report, the annual reports of this 
Commission, and the annual USTR report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance already contain ample 
evidence to support all of the potential claims noted above.  Add to that the work done in the EU, Japan, 
Canada and others, and at the OECD along with other multilateral institutions, and it becomes clear that 
there is more than sufficient evidence to demonstrate that China’s economy is operating in ways that 
undermine the WTO’s rules-based, market-based system.  Indeed, one of the many benefits of bringing a 
case as a coalition is that each member of the coalition can contribute the evidence that they have collected 
and the experience of their companies. 
Fifth, some would argue that WTO cases have already been tried, with some success and some 
failure.  It is true that China has been challenged in 40 disputes brought to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system, with 22 of those cases arising from complaints filed by the United States, eight coming from the 
EU, four from Mexico, three from Canada, with Japan and Guatemala also bringing claims against China.16  
And a number of them (at least 15) have found against China.  While the actual extent of Chinese 
compliance with WTO rulings can be questioned, in a number of cases, China has removed or amended its 
offending measures and in five others, China has reached a settlement agreement with the complaining 
party.   The problem with many of these cases is that the challenges were relatively narrow, limited to a 
few Chinese measures, or to a particular industry or set of producers.  While some of the more recent cases, 
including in particular the case on subsidies for aluminum and the Section 301-related case on IPR 
violations, have attempted to bring a specific case to showcase the underlying and more systemic problems, 
                                                          
15 Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, And Practices Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, And Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act Of 1974, Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF; at pg. 22. 
16 See the attached Appendix B for a full list of the cases brought against China and their outcomes.  Note that for 
eight of the cases, no panel has been requested, for two of the cases the panel is working on the case, and for two 
others, the DSB has agreed to establish the panel but the actual panelists to hear the case have not yet been 
appointed. 
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no panel has yet been requested in those cases and it remains to be seen whether a single case can provoke 
a more systemic response from China. 
As a result, some have come to believe that the WTO, as the 2017 USTR report to Congress states, 
“is not effective in addressing a trade regime that broadly conflicts with the fundamental underpinning of 
the WTO system.”17  I disagree.  I do not believe that the kind of broad case, with claims across sectors and 
across legal regimes, has been tried.  No one, for example, has challenged the Chinese system of intellectual 
property rights or technology transfers as a whole.  The WTO, therefore, has not been given the opportunity 
to show what can be done to save its core provisions.   Yet it is just such a systemic case that could provide 
the basis and the incentive to craft a legal remedy that could be beneficial to all sides. 
F. The WTO Case against China 
The essential thrust of any WTO case should be to hold China to the specific commitments it made 
when it joined the WTO in 2001 and to the overarching understanding embodied in the Marrakesh 
Declaration that WTO members participate “based upon open, market-oriented policies.”18  The specific 
commitments China made are found in the texts of the WTO Agreements, China’s Protocol of Accession 
to the WTO, certain designated paragraphs of the accompanying Working Party Report, and China’s 
schedules of commitments.19 The schedules cover tariffs and non-tariff measures applicable to agricultural 
trade and industrial goods (commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT) 
and services (commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, or GATS). The Accession 
Protocol and Working Party Report thereto also set out China promises on how it would fulfill its WTO 
obligations.  
Every WTO case must be based on government measures (i.e., laws, regulations, rulings or 
practices), whether written or not, that violate one or more specific commitments or that “nullify or impair” 
a benefit provided to members of the WTO.20  It is this combination of both actual violations and the non-
violation impairment of benefits that should be the focus of the case at the WTO.  
Among the things that could be included in such a big, bold case are the following, understanding 
that this is not an exhaustive list: 
1.  Technology Transfer  
One of the key findings of the Section 301 Report is that the Chinese government uses both foreign 
ownership restrictions and administrative licensing and approvals processes to force technology transfer in 
                                                          
17 2017 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance at 5. 
18 Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, Preamble 
19 See Report of the Working Party to the Accession of China to the WTO, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001. Para 
342 sets forth the specific paragraphs of the Working Party Report that are considered to be incorporated into the 
Protocol of Accession itself.  These paragraphs are therefore considered to be equally legally binding on China as 
the provisions in its Protocol or the text of the WTO Agreements.  
20 The WTO Appellate Body, in EC-Asbestos described nullification and impairment:  “Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth 
a cause of action for a claim that a Member has failed to carry out one or more of its obligations under the GATT 
1994.  A claim under Article XXIII:1(a), therefore, lies when a Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with 
a provision of the GATT 1994.  Article XXIII:1(b) sets forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the 
application of a measure, a Member has 'nullified or impaired' 'benefits' accruing to another Member, 'whether or not 
that measure conflicts with the provisions' of the GATT 1994.  Thus, it is not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to 
establish that the measure involved is inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994.  Cases under 
Article XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason, sometimes described as 'non-violation' cases.” Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Asbestos, para. 185. 
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exchange for either the investment approval itself or for the numerous administrative approvals needed to 
establish or operate a business in China. 
However, China clearly committed (in one of the legally binding paragraphs of its Working Party 
report) that it would not condition investments on the transfer of technology:  
The allocation, permission or rights for importation and investment would not be 
conditional upon performance requirements set by national or sub-national authorities, or 
subject to secondary conditions covering, for example, the conduct of research, the 
provision of offsets or other forms of industrial compensation including specified types or 
volumes of business opportunities, the use of local inputs or the transfer of technology. 
(Emphasis added).21 
While the Section 301 Report clearly notes the difficulty in proving the technology transfer 
mandates, given that many of them are unwritten, and that others are done in the course of a negotiation 
between two ostensibly private parties (even though the Chinese entity may be either state-owned or have 
Communist Party members on its board), recent decisions of the WTO Appellate Body have made it clear 
that unwritten measures can be challenged.22  Given the clear commitment made by China and the WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade Related Investments’ (TRIMs) prohibition on treating foreign investment less 
favorably than Chinese investment, China’s practices resulting in the forced or coerced transfer of 
technology should be challenged. 
2.  Discriminatory Licensing Restrictions   
The second key finding of the Section 301 Report is that China’s regime of technology regulations 
does not allow U.S. (or other foreign firms) to license their technology (or choose not to license it) under 
the conditions and terms that they would like or that would prevail in a market economy.  The Chinese 
regulations, among other things, discriminate against foreign technology, putting foreign technology 
importers at a disadvantage relative to Chinese companies and imposing additional restrictions on the use 
and enjoyment of technology and intellectual property rights simply because the technology is of foreign 
origin.  This violates China’s commitment to provide national treatment.   
Unlike the concerns for the unwritten and under-the-table nature of the forced technology transfer 
practices, these measures are formal laws and regulations that are well-known to the United States and 
others.  Indeed, Japan, the US and the EU have been raising concerns about these rules in the TRIPS Council 
and other WTO forums.  Some of these same laws and regulations are the source of the United States’ and 
the EU’s May 2018 requests for consultations with China.   
China’s commitments here are clear: China ensured “national and MFN treatment to foreign right-
holders regarding all intellectual property rights across the board in compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement.”23 In enacting laws and imposing regulations which discriminate against foreign holders of 
intellectual property rights and which restrict foreign right holders’ ability to protect certain intellectual 
property rights, China has broken those commitments and violated its WTO obligations. 
3.  Outbound Investment and Made in China 2025  
                                                          
21 Paragraph 203, Working Party Report. See also Section 7.3 of China’s Protocol of Accession. 
22 See, for example, Appellate Body Reports, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, 
WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/R / WT/DS445/AB/R, adopted 26 January 2015. 
23 Paragraph 256, Working Party Report, one of the legally binding paragraphs of China’s Working Party Report. 
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The third major finding of the Section 301 Report is that China has engaged in a wide-ranging, 
well-funded effort to direct and support the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies 
and assets to obtain cutting-edge technology, in service of China’s industrial policy.   The report also notes 
that the role of the state in directing and supporting this outbound investment strategy is pervasive, and 
evident at multiple levels of government – central, regional, and local.  The government has devoted 
massive amounts of financing to encourage and facilitate outbound investment in areas it deems strategic.  
In support of this goal, China has enlisted a broad range of actors to support this effort, including SOEs, 
state-backed funds, government policy banks, and private companies.   
Concerns about these policies were heightened by the release by China’s State Council in 2015 of 
its Made in China 2025 initiative, a “comprehensive blueprint aimed at transforming China into an 
advanced manufacturing leader [through] preferential access to capital to domestic companies in order to 
promote their indigenous research and development capabilities, support their ability to acquire technology 
from abroad, and enhance their overall competitiveness.”24 
Because much of the outward investment regimes and the Made in China 2025 plan are formal 
laws, regulations or program of the Chinese government, basic documentation for a WTO claim is relatively 
straightforward.  However, the WTO rules have much less say over outward investment, making the nature 
of a WTO claim in this area more complicated.  Nonetheless, there are some commitments that could form 
the basis for a violation claim, including a lack of reciprocity.  For example, China stated that its IPR laws 
will provide that “any foreigner would be treated . . .  on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.”25  Yet as 
the Section 301 Report amply documents, the Chinese administrative approval regime imposes 
substantially more restrictive requirements than that of the United States.  U.S. firms face numerous 
barriers, such as sectoral restrictions, joint venture requirements, equity caps, and technology transfer 
requirements when they seek access to the Chinese market.  Chinese firms do not face anything remotely 
approaching these types of restrictions when investing in the United States.  
In addition, China’s outward investment regime and programs like Made in China 2025 could be 
challenged under the WTO’s GATT Article XXIII “non-violation” given the non-market nature of China’s 
outward investment scheme.  As the Section 301 Report notes: “Market-based considerations... do not 
appear to be the primary driver of much of China’s outbound investment and acquisition activity in areas 
targeted by its industrial policies.  Instead, China directs and supports its firms to seek technologies that 
enhance China’s development goals in each strategic sector.”26 Yet China, in joining the WTO, was 
becoming part of an organization calling for the “participation of ... economies in the world trading system, 
based upon open, market-oriented policies and the commitments set out in the Uruguay Round Agreements 
and Decisions.”27   
 4.  Theft of Trade Secrets and Other Intellectual Property  
The fourth area identified by the Section 301 Report are cyber intrusions into U.S. commercial 
networks targeting confidential business information held by U.S. firms, conducted and supported by the 
government of China.  These cyber intrusions have allowed the Chinese government to gain unauthorized 
                                                          
24 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections.” 
25 Paragraph 256 of China’s Working Party Report (one of the paragraphs that is legally binding). 
26 Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, And Practices Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, And Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act Of 1974, Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF; pg. 148. 
27 Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994. 
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access to a wide range of commercially-valuable business information, including trade secrets, technical 
data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal communications.   
The Section 301 Report and the numerous documents and studies it reference, along with the 
Department of Justice indictment of Chinese government hackers for cyber intrusions and economic 
espionage,28 leave little doubt that China has engaged in serial theft of U.S. intellectual property rights, 
trade secrets in particular.  
 The clear claim under the WTO is a violation of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  TRIPS covers the broad array of intellectual property rights (i.e., 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, industrial designs, geographical indications, integrated 
circuits) and provides both minimum standards of protection and a broad based requirement for 
enforcement.  For example, Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that people and companies “shall 
have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, 
acquired by, or used by others without their consent . . ,” while TRIPs Article 41 imposes an affirmative 
obligation on all WTO Members: “Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures… are available under 
their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights 
covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”  Engaging in and permitting the theft, whether through 
cyber intrusions or not, is a violation of the basic requirement that China’s laws and its efforts to enforce 
intellectual property rights “must have real force in the real world of commerce.”29  
 5.  Investment Restrictions   
As noted above, Chinese government officials at times use China’s current foreign investment 
approval process to restrict or unreasonably delay market entry for foreign companies, to require foreign 
companies to take on a Chinese partner, or to extract valuable, deal-specific commercial concessions as a 
price for market entry.30 Foreign companies are often told that they will have to transfer technology, conduct 
research and development in China or satisfy performance requirements relating to exportation or the use 
of local content if they want their investments approved.31 
In addition, in the name of security, a number of additional restrictions have been placed on foreign 
investment.  The National Security Law includes a more restrictive national security review process and 
other significant restrictions on foreign investment, such as restrictions on the purchase, sale and use of 
foreign ICT products and services, cross-border data flow restrictions and data localization requirements.32
 The Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry (Foreign Investment Catalogue), imposes 
significant restrictions in key services sectors, extractive industries, agriculture and certain manufacturing 
industries.  
                                                          
28 US. v. Wang Dong et al., (W. D. Pa., May 1, 2014). 
29 James Bacchus, “How the World Trade Organization Can Curb China’s Intellectual Property Transgressions,” 
CATO, March 22, 2018.  
30 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018, pp. 83-95. 
31 For example, in October 2012, MOF, MIIT and MOST issued two new measures establishing a fiscal support 
fund for manufacturers of New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) and NEV batteries. As foreign automobile manufacturers 
are required to form 50-percent joint ventures with Chinese partners, these requirements could effectively require 
them to transfer core NEV technology to their Chinese joint-venture partners in order to receive the available 
government funding.  
32 The recently enacted Cybersecurity Law adds additional restrictions to those in the National Security Law. 
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A number of the provisions in these laws and catalogues violate the commitment China made in its 
Protocol of Accession:  “China shall ensure that... the right of importation or investment by national and 
sub-national authorities, is not conditioned on:  whether competing domestic suppliers of such products 
exist; or performance requirements of any kind, such as local content, offsets, the transfer of technology, 
export performance or the conduct of research and development in China.”33  These also violate China’s 
basic commitment to national treatment, requiring that China treat foreign companies no less favorably than 
it treats Chinese companies.34   
6.  Lack of an independent judiciary 
7.   Subsidies 
Many regard the WTO’s difficulty in regulating subsidies as among its greatest weaknesses, 
particularly when it comes to the size and the nature of the subsidies being provided in China.  For example, 
subsidization and the resultant overcapacity have been problems in China, particularly with State-Owned-
Enterprises (SOEs) which are provided with a variety of free or below-cost resources (such as land and raw 
materials), raising questions as to whether inputs provided by such SOEs to downstream manufacturers 
should be treated as government subsidies. The provisions of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) makes proving the existence of such subsidies difficult. Specifically, the 
agreement defines a subsidy as a “financial contribution by a government or any public body.”35 The WTO 
Appellate Body has interpreted “public body” to mean government or governmental entities that exercise 
governmental functions36 – i.e., that the entity must possess, exercise, or be vested with “governmental 
authority” and be performing a “governmental function.” This interpretation effectively takes Chinese 
SOEs out of the definition of subsidy and renders the WTO framework ineffective in addressing these cases.  
Second, demonstrating the existence of a subsidy also requires showing that a benefit was provided 
to the subsidy recipient, with “benefit” being defined as making the recipient better off than they would 
have been absent the subsidy.  Such a demonstration requires a comparison to a market benchmark to 
determine whether the terms of a loan or the price of a government purchase were more favorable than 
market-based terms.  Because of the nature of China’s economy, benchmarks are often hard to prove. 
Moreover, remedies available under the WTO subsidy rules are perceived to be inadequate in 
addressing concerns about China. The ASCM does not provide an outright ban on subsidies but rather 
allows countries to take one of two actions when faced with subsidized goods: 1) countervailing duty actions 
if the subsidized goods are coming into their markets and causing injury to their domestic producers, with 
the amount of the duty equal to the portion of the cost of production that has been covered by the subsidy, 
or 2) adverse effects cases at the WTO, if the damage from trade in the subsidized product is causing harm 
in third-country markets.37 The problem with countervailing duties is that they may simply push the 
subsidized goods into other markets, thus suppressing prices. The problem with adverse effects cases is that 
                                                          
33 China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO, Section 7.3 
34 China’s basic national treatment commitment is underscored in Paragraph 18 of the Working Party Report (one of 
the legally binding paragraphs): “The representative of China further confirmed that China would provide the same 
treatment to Chinese enterprises, including foreign-funded enterprises, and foreign enterprises and individuals in 
China.” 
35 See Article I of the SCM Agreement. Assuming that a measure is a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement, it nevertheless is not subject to the SCM Agreement unless it has been specifically provided to an 
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.  
36 See United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS379/AB/R. 
37 Part V, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
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remedies in the WTO are prospective only so the requirement to “remove the adverse effects of the subsidy” 
often does little to dismantle the capacity that China has built to produce those goods in the first place.  
In recent years, it appears that China has begun to tie subsidies to lists of qualified manufacturers 
located in China. For example, the central government and certain local governments provide subsidies in 
connection with the purchase of NEVs, but they only make these subsidies available when certain Chinese-
made NEVs, not imported NEVs, are purchased. China appears to pursue similar policies involving NEV 
batteries, leading to lost sales by U.S.-based manufacturers.38  
China made two basic commitments with respect to subsidies when it joined the WTO: 1) to notify 
the WTO of all the subsidies it granted or maintained, and 2) to eliminate all export contingent and import 
substitution subsidies.  It also made general national treatment commitments not to discriminate against 
foreigners.  It appears that China is violating all three commitments.   The hope in bringing a broad 
challenge would be to force a long-overdue discussion about what the WTO can do to change its approach 
to disciplining subsidies.  
8.  Export Restraints 
In some situations, China has used its border taxes to encourage the export of certain finished 
products over other finished products within a particular sector. For example, in the past, China has targeted 
value-added steel products, particularly wire products and steel pipe and tube products, causing a surge in 
exports of these products, many of which ended up in the U.S. market. Furthermore, despite its 
commitments to the contrary, China has taken no steps to abandon its use of trade-distortive VAT export 
rebates.   Export taxes on any products other than those specific in Annex 6 to China’s Protocol of Accession 
are prohibited and ripe for challenge.39 
9.  Standards 
China seems to be actively pursuing the development of unique requirements, despite the existence 
of well-established international standards, as a means for protecting domestic companies from competing 
foreign standards and technologies. Indeed, China has already adopted unique standards for digital 
televisions, and it is trying to develop unique standards and technical regulations in a number of other 
sectors, including, for example, autos, telecommunications equipment, Internet protocols, wireless local 
area networks, radio frequency identification tag technology, audio and video coding and fertilizer as well 
as software encryption and mobile phone batteries. This strategy has the potential to create significant 
barriers to entry into China’s market, as the cost of compliance will be high for foreign companies, while 
China will also be placing its own companies at a disadvantage in its export markets, where international 
standards prevail. There are also concerns that integrating its domestic standards requirements into its 
certification or accreditation schemes would make them de facto mandatory.40  
China’s standards are subject to the WTO requirements on standards, both those contained in the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement) (relating to food, animal and plant 
standards) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  Both Agreements contain basic 
national treatment requirements, preferences for the harmonization of standards with those set by 
                                                          
38 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018; pg.90 
39 “China shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this 
Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.” Section 11.3, China’s 
Protocol of Accession to the WTO. 
40 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018, pp. 60-61. 
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recognized international standards organizations and a basic requirement that standards not be more trade 
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.  To the extent that China’s standards can be shown 
to have effectively created unnecessary obstacles to trade or to have unreasonably departed from 
international standards, they can be challenged at the WTO. 
10. Services  
China’s commitments with respect to services are those found in its GATS (General Agreement on 
Trade in Services) schedules and in more recent commitments China has made to improve on those initial 
commitments.  The problem is that in a number of sectors, China has not followed through previously 
agreed upon changes.  For example:   
Insurance41: While China allows wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries in the non-life (i.e., property 
and casualty) insurance sector, the market share of foreign-invested companies in this sector is only about 
two percent. Some U.S. insurance companies established in China sometimes encounter difficulties in 
getting the Chinese regulatory authorities to issue timely approvals of their requests to open up new internal 
branches to expand their operations. In November 2017, China announced that it would be easing certain 
of its foreign equity restrictions in the insurance services sector, but to date it has not done so. 
Securities and management services42: China only permits foreign companies to establish as 
Chinese-foreign joint ventures, with foreign equity capped at 49 percent. In November 2017, China 
announced that it would be easing certain of its foreign equity restrictions in the securities and asset 
management services sectors, but to date it has not done so.  
Legal services43: China has issued measures intended to implement the legal services commitments 
that it made upon joining the WTO. However, these measures restrict the types of legal services that can be 
provided by foreign law firms, including through a prohibition on foreign law firms hiring lawyers qualified 
to practice Chinese law, and impose lengthy delays for the establishment of new offices. 
The WTO case should work to hold China to all of the commitments it has made to open ups its 
services sector. 
11.  Agriculture 
U.S. exporters continued to be confronted with non-transparent application of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures, many of which have appeared to lack scientific bases and have impeded 
market access for many U.S. agricultural products. China’s seemingly unnecessary and arbitrary inspection-
related import requirements also continued to impose burdens and regulatory uncertainty on U.S. 
agricultural producers exporting to China, as did the registration and certification requirements that China 
imposes, or proposes to impose, on U.S. food manufacturers.44 
Any SPS measures adopted without a sound scientific basis or without a risk assessment or without 
being based on certain international standards are clearly subject to challenge at the WTO, with past cases 
indicating a high likelihood that any such measures would be struck down.  The inspection-related 
requirements may also violate the WTO’s Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, which contains both 
non-discrimination and transparency requirements. 
                                                          
41 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018, p.125 
42 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018, p. 20 
43 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018, p.129 
44 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018, p. 96. 
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12.  Transparency45 
The issue of transparency and access to China’s laws, regulations and rules was of key concern to 
WTO members when China joined in 2001. China’s Protocol of Accession and five paragraphs of its 
Working Party clearly commit China to making all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to trade 
readily available and, upon request, available prior to their implementation or enforcement, along with 
making them available in one or more of the official languages of the WTO (English, French and Spanish).   
As the following examples show, China has not lived up to these commitments and can be challenged on 
these (and other) transparency failures at the WTO:  
Publication of laws: While trade-related administrative regulations and departmental rules are 
more commonly (but still not regularly) published in the journal, it is less common for other measures such 
as opinions, circulars, orders, directives and notices to be published, even though they are in fact all binding 
legal measures. In addition, China does not normally publish in the journal certain types of trade-related 
measures, such as subsidy measures, nor does it normally publish sub-central government trade-related 
measures in the journal.  
Notice and comment procedures: At the May 2011 S&ED meeting, China committed to issue a 
measure implementing the requirement to publish all proposed trade and economic related administrative 
regulations and departmental rules on the website of the State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office 
(SCLAO) for a public comment period of not less than 30 days. In April 2012, the SCLAO issued two 
measures that appear to address this requirement. Since then, despite continuing U.S. engagement, little 
noticeable improvement in the publication of departmental rules for public comment appears to have taken 
place, even though China confirmed that those two SCLAO measures are binding on central government 
ministries. 
13.  Non-violation  
 Last, but certainly not least, a broad and deep case at the WTO should include a non-violation claim 
under Article XXIII of the GATT, focused on the myriad of ways in which China’s economy fails to meet 
the Marrakesh Declaration that the WTO was designed as a world trading system “based upon open, market-
oriented policies.” The non-violation clause of Article XXIII represents a real-world attempt to solve the 
broader problem of contractual incompleteness. It provides a legal cause of action against measures that do 
not violate the treaty but that nevertheless upset the reasonable expectations of the parties and can be aimed 
at policies that might otherwise be beyond the reach of the GATT/WTO agreements.46  Non-violation 
                                                          
45 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, USTR, January 2018, p. 137 to 141 
46 Article XXIII provides: 
Nullification or Impairment 
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded 
as the result of 
 (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or 
 (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the 
provisions of this Agreement, or 
 (c) the existence of any other situation,  
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or 
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.  Any contracting party thus 
approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it. 
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claims have been rare.47  WTO members generally agree that “the non-violation nullification or impairment 
remedy should be approached with caution and treated as an exceptional concept. The reason for this 
caution is straightforward. Members negotiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally 
would expect to be challenged for actions not in contravention of those rules.”48  
 However, the wide-spread concerns with China’s economy and the difficulties it has raised for 
WTO members suggests that this is indeed time for an exceptional approach.  As made clear in Harvard 
Law Professor Mark Wu’s “China Inc.” analysis, China’s economy is structured differently from any other 
major economy and is different in ways that were not anticipated by WTO negotiators.49   It is the complex 
web of overlapping networks and relationships, both formal and informal, between the state, the Communist 
Party, SOEs, private enterprises, financial institutions, investors and others with Chinese government 
oversight over state assets (SASAC), financial sector organization (Central Huijin Investment Ltd.), heavy 
state planning, placement of Communist party officials in key positions, specific forms of corporate 
networks and state-private sector linkages that make China’s economy so unique and so hard for the trading 
rules to deal with.50 
 It is exactly for this type of situation that the non-violation nullification and impairment clause was 
drafted.  The United States and all other WTO members had legitimate expectations that China would 
increasingly behave as a market economy—that it would achieve a discernable separation between its 
government and its private sector, that private property rights and an understanding of who controls and 
makes decisions in major enterprises would be clear, that subsidies would be curtailed, that theft of IP rights 
would be punished and diminished in amount, that SOEs would make purchases based on commercial 
considerations, that the Communist Party would not, by fiat, occupy critical seats within major “private” 
enterprises and that standards and regulations would be published for all to see.  It is this collective failure 
by China, rather than any specific violation of individual provisions, that should form of the core of a big, 
bold WTO case.  Because addressing these cross-cutting, systemic problems is the only way to correct for 
the collective failures of both the rules-based trading system and China.  
G. Objectives of Such a WTO Case 
Most WTO disputes have as their goal a ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body that the measures 
complained about violate one or more provisions of the WTO Agreements, after which the responding party 
brings its measures into compliance, often by removing or amending the offending measures.  Here, while 
one of the goals would indeed be to seek certain specific rulings of that type, the goals would be much 
broader— 
1) to seek a common understanding of where the current set of rules are failing and need to be 
changed (with disciplines on subsidies at the top of that list);  
2) to begin the process of scoping out exactly what those rule changes would look like to 
accommodate the views of the broader WTO membership;  
                                                          
47 “Although the non-violation remedy is an important and accepted tool of WTO/GATT dispute settlement and has 
been 'on the books' for almost 50 years, we note that there have only been eight cases in which panels or working 
parties have substantively considered Article XXIII:1(b) claims.” Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.36. 
48  Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.36. 
49 Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
57, Spring 2016, pp. 261-324. 
50 Mark Wu at 284. 
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3) to seek recognition from China of where and to what degree its economic structure can or cannot 
fit within a fair, transparent and market-based trading system; and  
4) to give China the opportunity to make a choice that is its sovereign right to make – whether it 
wants to change its system to one that does fit within the parameters of the WTO or not.   
As former USTR official Harry Broadman put it, “There’s no right or wrong here.  If China’s choice results 
in conduct that does not square with the rules of the WTO . . . so be it.  Beijing should then exit the WTO 
gracefully or be shown the door.”51   The hope would be that both China and the coalition of parties to the 
dispute would appreciate that the trading system is better off with China as part of it, that the WTO rules 
are in some places and in some ways part of the problem and need to be changed, but that tinkering at the 
margins for China will not suffice. 
G. Conclusion 
The concerns with China are global concerns.  The tools used to address the concerns and the solution 
sought should be global as well.  And that means using the WTO.  And it means fixing the WTO,   
particularly its dispute settlement system, to ensure that the WTO is ready and able to take on the challenge 
that China presents to world trading system.  
 
 
                                                          
51 Harry G. Broadman, “The Coalition-Based Trade Strategy Trump Should Pursue Toward China,” Forbes, April 9, 
2018. 
